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EVOLUTION OF THE SECONDARY BOYCOTT AND




T IS now well settled that there is no constitutional right to strike
and that the right to strike and engage in concerted activities
may be regulated by our legislatures and our courts.1 However, the
right of employees to strike and to engage in concerted activities
has been recognized as lawful since 1921' and has been given legisla-
tive sanction since 1932.' This right was affirmatively protected
through the Wagner Act of 193 5,4 and although limited in numer-
ous instances by decisions of the NLRB and the courts in cases such
as sit down strikes, strikes in breach of contract, and other circum-
stances,' the right to strike and engage in concerted activity by the
employees and their unions has been recognized and protected by
Sections 7 and 13 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Conversely, this right
has been regulated by other sections of the Taft-Hartley Act, par-
ticularly by Section 8 (b) (4), but including Section 8 (d), with
leeway for further regulation by the states through the passage of
"Right-to-Work" laws or similar legislation allowed by Section
14(b)."
SECONDARY BOYCOTT
Section 8 (b) (4) (the so-called secondary boycott section) in
subsections (C) and (D) regulates primary strikes by employees.
Since these are relatively simple provisions and space is limited these
two subdvisions will be only very briefly discussed. The other two
t From a paper delivered at the Sixth Labor Law Institute of the Southwestern Legal
Foundation, Southern Methodist University, on April 25, 1957.
*Former Chief Law Officer, 15th Region, NLRB; member of the firm of Dodd,
Hirsch, Barker and Meunier, Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana; with the as-
sistance of Wilfred H. Boudreaux, Associate.
'International Union, UAW, AFL v. Wisconsin Employment Relation Bd., 336 U.S.
245 (1939); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924); Jennings, The Right to Strike:
Concerted Activities under the Taft-Hartley Act, 40 CAL. L. REV. 12 (1952).
' American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
'Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-15 (1932).
449 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq.
SNLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). Also see Scullin Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1946); Thomp-
son Products, 70 N.L.R.B. 13 (1946), 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947); American News Co.,
55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944); McKay Radio, 96 N.L.R.B. 740, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
'Local 10, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, AFL v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192
(1953).
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subsections, (A) and (B), are the basis for most of the discussion
in this article.
Section 8 (b) (4) is one of the most difficult sections of a difficult
statute to interpret; the interpretations are constantly changing al-
most in direct ratio to the number of new members appointed to
the Board.' Ex-Chairman Farmer expressed it thus:
Section 8 (b) (4) is one of the most complex provisions of the statute.
It deals with a wide range of union conduct which has been telescoped
into the term secondary boycott. A phrase which is convenient for
purpose of ready reference and which provides scant guidance in the
decision of particular cases. Perhaps more than any other this is a field
in which we should tread with cautious feet in our attempts to mark
the boundaries between conduct which is permissible and that which
is interdicted.'
The Section 8 (b) (4) provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a union or its agents (4) to
engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer
to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their em-
ployment to use, manufacture, process, transport or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employed person to join any labor or
employer organization or any employer or person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any
other producer, processor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person;
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 9 . . . . (Emphasis added.)
Thus Section 8 (b) (4) permits the union to engage in activities
which are "traditional and permissible in a primary strike," but
not activities which are directed at employees of secondary employ-
ers for the proscribed objects. The Board and the courts in each
case must strike the delicate balance between " . . . the dual con-
gressional objects of preserving the rights of labor organizations
Since the advent of the Republican administration six appointments have been made
to the NLRB: Guy Farmer, Chairman, July 13, 1953-August 27, 1955; Philip Ray
Rogers, August 28, 1953; Albert C. Beeson, March 2, 1954-April 4, 1955; Boyd Leedom,
April 4, 1955; Steven Bean, December 1, 1955; Joseph Jenkins, February 29, 1957.
Ivar H. Peterson, Democratic appointee, served until August 26, 1956, and Abe Murdock,
reappointed 1952, continues to serve. None of these new appointees has ever been closely
associated with labor organizations. This may account in part for the rather unsym-
pathetic treatment (from the union's view) this section has received recently in the
complete reversal of older decisions.
'McAllister Transfer, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954).
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to bring pressure to bear upon offending employers in primary labor
disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from
pressures and controversies not their own."'
Despite the provisions of Section 8 (c) of the statute and the
First Amendment, inducement of secondary employees by either
oral or written communications or by peaceful picketing is prohib-
ited by this section, when done for the objectives forbidden by the
section. It is " . . . the objective of the unions' secondary activi-
ties ...and not the quality of the means employed to accompany
the objective which was the dominant factor motivating Congress
in enacting that provision .... ""
Before going into specific cases, let us set out some well settled
principles.
Direct appeals to an employer are permitted by Section 8 (b) (4),
and where an employer, at the request of a union which has re-
frained from the use of threats or direct appeals to his employees,
voluntarily agrees to boycott the goods of another employer, there
is no violation of Section 8(b) (4) since there has been neither a
strike nor inducement or encouragement of the employees to engage
in such conduct."
Section 8 (b) (4) does not prohibit consumer boycotts by appeal
to the individual members of a union (or to the public) as long
as the appeals are confined to the members as individuals, not as
employees, and are intended to induce them simply to withhold
their personal patronage;" but where the union goes further and
takes active steps pursuant to a consumer product boycott and
appeals not only to the individuals as consumers but also to em-
ployees of neutral employers not to handle, use, work on or buy
for their employer the product of the primary employer, they run
afoul of this section of the act." Thus, placing an employer or his
product on an unfair list at the union meeting or within the union's
'NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
" International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 704
(1951); United Brotherhood Carpenters and Joiners, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949).
11Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 210, 36 L.R.R.M. 1378 (1955), enforce-
ment granted, NLRB v. Local 11, Carpenters (General Mill Work Corp.), - F.2d -,
39 L.R.R.M. 2731 (6th Cir. April 10, 1957); McAllister Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B.
1769, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954) (opinion by Farmer); Arkansas Express, 92 N.L.R.B.
255, 27 L.R.R.M. 1077 (1950); Consolidated Frame Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1295, 27
L.R.R.M. 1008 (1950).
1"Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 20, 38 L.R.R.M. 2289 (DC.
Cir. 1956).
"
3 Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL, 113 N.L.R.B. 275, 36 L.R.R.M. 307 (1955);
Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 210, 36 L.R.R.M. 1378 (1955); Sound Shingle
Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1159, 31 L.R.R.M. 202 (1952), enforcement granted, 33 L.R.R.M.
2656 (9th Cir. 1954).
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own periodical is not unlawful." But the implementation of such
a list by telephoning the specific employees of the secondary em-
ployer and advising them of the list, or picketing at the scene of
the secondary employer's premises, may result in an illegal second-
ary boycott.1
Nor is it necessary in product boycott cases that the union should
have a direct, active dispute with the primary producer of the
product. It is sufficient if the only dispute takes place at the sec-
ondary employer's premises."
Under precedents set by the Board and approved by the courts,
for the Board to find a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) it is only
necessary that one of the objects of the union is proscribed by the
act; it need not be the sole object of the conduct under scrutiny.17
Now turning to specific cases, we see that since these cases turn
on the question of the object of the inducement, the entire factual
situation in each case should be important, as it was under older
Board decisions. Slight differences in the facts which may indicate
an unlawful objective make tremendous differences in the results.
It is impossible in this article to discuss all of the various factual
situations with which the Board has been confronted. The early rule
approved by the United States Supreme Court was that where the
appeals, whether oral, written or by picketing, affecting the em-
ployees of secondary employers were confined to the vicinity of the
primary employer's premises, even though they induced concerted
activity on the part of the secondary employees approaching these
premises, the conduct was traditional and permissible in support of
a primary strike." Even picketing at the premises of the secondary
employer when the primary employer's truck and equipment were
present was permissible if the primary employer could not con-
14 See Western, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 336, 27 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1951); Grauman Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 755 (1949).
15NLRB v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, AFL, 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.
1949); United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, AFL v. Sperry, 170 F.2d 863 (10th
Cir. 1948); see Western, Inc., supra, note 14; Printing Specialties & Paper Converters
Union, 82 N.L.R.B. 271 (1949).
16General Mill Work Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1084, enforcement granted, - F.2d -, 39
L.R.R.M. 2731 (6th Cir. April 10, 1957); Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 210,
36 L.R.RM. 1378 (1955); Sound Shingle Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1159, 31 L.R.R.M. 202
(1952).
7 NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. NLRB, 237 F.2d 20, 38 L.R.R.M. 2289 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Sand Door & Plywood Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 210, 36 L.R.R.M. 1378 (1955); Standard Oil
Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 868, 32 L.R.R.M. 1381 (1953); Acousti Engraving Co., 97 N.L.R.B.
574, 29 L.R.R.M. 1138 (1951).
" NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 28 L.R.R.M. 2105 (1951);
NLRB v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, 191 F.2d 65, 28 L.R.R.M. 2450 (2d Cir. 1951). See
also Ryan, Pure Oil and Crump, Inc., infra.
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veniently be reached at his primary situs of employment."
The cases where the premises of the two employers (the primary
and the secondary) were separate and distinct with no interchange
gave the Board little trouble, since the extension of the picketing
or the appeal to the employees of the secondary employer clearly
demonstrated the unlawful objective in most instances.
The cases that have given the Board most difficulty are common
situs cases where both the primary and secondary employers are
operating on the same premises. Originally the Board adopted the
doctrine that where the dispute was taking place at the situs occu-
pied by the primary employer, even though there was a secondary
employer on the premises, the picketing was primary picketing,
and was permissible even though it induced the approaching em-
ployees of the secondary employer not to report for work. The
Board held in the Ryan case:"0
As is virtually always the case an object of the picketing is to per-
suade all persons from entering such premises for business reasons.
The picketing which is primary did not lose its character and become
secondary because employees of other employers were induced to
remain away from work.
Also to this effect are the Pure Oil" and Crump, Inc." cases. Al-
though in Pure Oil the union was picketing a ship while it was
at dock in an oil refinery, there was in the area no other place where
such a ship could be picketed, and the case may be considered for
this purpose as holding that this was the primary employer's (the
ship's) situs.
On the other hand a violation was found under the following
facts which clearly indicated an unlawful objective: where there
were several employers engaged at a common situs and the picket
sign did not clearly indicate that the dispute was only with the
primary employer, or where other factors indicated that the union
had a secondary motive, as for instance where the union picketed
only when the union employees of the secondary employer were
present;2 3 where the picketing was obviously directed at the sec-
ondary contractor and not at the contractor with whom the union
'"Schultz Refrigerated Service, 87 N.L.R.B. 502, 25 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1949).
20 85 N.L.R.B. 417, 24 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1949), cited with approval, NLRB v. Inter-
national Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
2184 N.L.R.B. 315, 34 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1949).
22112 N.L.R.B. 311, 36 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1955).
"' Internaional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951);
Sanuel Langer, 52 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1949) enforcement granted.
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had the dispute;24 and where the picketing continued after the
trucks of the primary employer with whom the dispute existed had
left the premises of the secondary employer."
This problem of common situs picketing was carefully analyzed
by the Board in the Moore Dry Dock Co. case," where the union
was picketing a foreign vessel at an American shipyard for the
purpose of protesting the transfer of this former American vessel
to a foreign flag. The crew was aboard the vessel engaged in pre-
paring for the voyage and the employees of the shipyard refused
to cross the picket line for the purpose of working on the vessel.
There the Board laid down four clear criteria governing common
situs picketing. While recognizing that the object of picketing is to
influence third persons to withhold their business or services from
the struck employer and that in this respect there is no difference
between lawful primary picketing and unlawful secondary picket-
ing as proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4)," the Board nevertheless held
that, even though secondary employees are directly affected: if
(1) the picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the
dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises, (2) at the
time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal
business at the site, (3) the picketing is placed as reasonably close
to the location of the situs as possible and (4) the picketing dis-
closes clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer, such
picketing does not violate Section 8 (b) (4) even though it affects
secondary employers."
The Per Se Doctrine
From the time of the Moore Dry Dock decision (1949) until
the rendition of the Board's decision in Washington Coca-Cola
(1953)2" those were the tests applied. In Washington Coca-Cola the
Board used a fifth test, a mechanical test, viz., that where the pri-
mary employer has no permanent establishment in the vicinity that
may be effectively picketed by the union, picketing at any sec-
ondary employer's location visited by the primary employer, either
by his trucks or his workers,"0 is per se violative of the Act if he
24Gould and Preissner, 82 N.L.R.B. 137 (1949), enforcement granted, NLRB v.
Denver Bldg. & Contr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
2 Sterling Beverages, 90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950).
2692 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
27Schultz Refrigerated Service, supra, note 19.
28 Columbia-Southern, I10 N.L.R.B. 206, 34 L.R.R.M. 1624 (1954). Cf. Richfield
Oil, 92 N.L.R.B. 1191, 28 L.R.R.M. 1436 (1950).
29 107 N.L.R.B. 299, 33 L.R.R.M. 1122 (1953).
30Otis Massey, 109 N.L.R.B. 275 (1954).
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(the primary employer) has a location elsewhere where effective
picketing can be done.
At first the Board rather narrowly restricted its per se doctrine
curtailing an extension of the picket line to premises of the sec-
ondary employer where the primary employer had its own situs that
could be effectively picketed. Thus in Pittsburgh Plate Glass,"' ren-
dered October 1954, it rejected the Trial Examiner's per se test and
restricted the application of Washington Coca-Cola and Otis Massey
(discussed in text, infra) since Pittsburgh's primary location was a
wholesale and industrial area (where presumably the dispute could
be as effectively publicized as in Washington Coca-Cola) and the
employees of Pittsburgh were at work substantially all day at the sec-
ondary situs of the contractors. The Board in Pittsburgh Plate Glass
said:
Implicit in that decision was our view that the Washington Coca-
Cola doctrine would not be applied where the premises of the secon-
dary employer harbor the situs of the dispute between the Union and
the primary employer, as in the instant matter.
Chairman Farmer and Members Peterson, Rogers and Beeson parti-
cipated in this decision.
The decision is also important in demonstrating the view that
where the picket sign at the situs of the contractors clearly carried
the name "Pittsburgh," it was not necessary for the union to tell
the employees of secondary employers on the job that they were
free to cross the picket lines (citing Stover Steel Service"2).
Later, in reaffirming its original per se doctrine, the Board ex-
plained in more detail in Southwest Motor Transport:3
The Board's conclusion rests on the sound premise that a union
which can direct its inducement to primary employees at the primary
employer's premises does not seek to accomplish any more with respect
to the same employees by directing the same inducement to these
employees at the premises of some other employer. Consequently
the only reasonable inference in such a situation is that inducements
which are ostensibly directed at the primary employer's employees
are in fact directd at the employees of the secondary employer. In
conclusion therefore the picketing under such circumstances violates
, . * the Act. The Board is effectuating the Congressional objective
of shielding unoffending employers from pressures and controversies
" 110 N.L.R.B. 455, 35 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1954). This case is not to be confused with
the earlier case of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 105 N.L.R.B. 740, 32 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1953),
infra n.59. Where referred to in the text the earlier case will be parenthetically desig-
nated "(No. 1)."
32108 N.L.R.B. 1575, 34 L.R.R.M. 1258 (1954).
83115 N.L.R.B. 981, 37 L.R.R.M. 1459 (1956).
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not their own, while at the same time leaving the union free to assert
its pressures upon the primary employer in a manner that will at most
have only an incidental effect on the secondary employers.
While the Washington Coca-Cola decision was enforced by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia34 on the facts found
by the Board, this same court gefused to enforce Campbell Coal Co.,
a companion case resting purely on the per se doctrine of the Board?
The facts were slightly different in that the employees of Campbell
Coal Co. spent only 25 % of their time at the situs of the primary
employer and 50% of their time on the construction sites, and,
though the union followed the trucks and picketed them at the
construction sites, the signs clearly indicated that the dispute was
with Campbell Coal and the secondary employers were so advised.
The court pointed out that its previous affirmance of the Wash-
ington Coca-Cola case did not constitute approval of the rule that
ambulatory picketing was per se a violation of 8 (b) (4) where an
appropriate picketing site was available, but that it had rested its
decision in that case upon additional findings present, and it there-
fore reversed Campbell Coal and remanded." The Supreme Court
refused certiorari.
In the meantime the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Otis-
Massey case3" also rejected the Board's per se doctrine where by
picket signs and pamphlets it was made clear to the employees at
the site of the secondary employers that the dispute was only with
Otis Massey, and where Otis Massey's employees were constantly
employed on the construction sites of the secondary employers, the
court holding that such picketing did not constitute a violation.
Several other courts have rejected and criticized as too mechanical
this per se doctrine," but the Board continues to follow it (even
reaffirming Campbell Coal on remand 3'). In each case now, how-
ever, the Board seizes upon some additional facts, however small,
and bases its decision, in addition to the per se doctrine, on the
record considered as a whole."' Generally there is a finding that
34220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
3ii0 N.L.R.B. 2192, 35 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1954).
3"Sales Drivers, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
" NLRB v. General Drivers, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 225 F.2d 205, 36
L.R.R.M. 2541 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
30 LeBus v. Truck Drivers, 141 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1956); Douds v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 139 F. Supp. 702 (So. D.N.Y. 1956). Cf. NLRB v. Truck
Drivers, AFL, 228 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1956) (after Otis-Massey).
39 116 N.L.R.B. 1020 (1956).
40 Clark Bros., 116 N.L.R.B. 1891 (1956); Caradine Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1956);
Barry Controls, 116 N.L.R.B. 1470 (1956); Crowley's Milk Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1408
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some evidence indicates that one of the four tests of Moore Dry
Dock are lacking, or that the union did not affirmatively make it
clear to the secondary employees of neutral employers that there
was no dispute with their employer. The Board apparently has com-
pletely abandoned the doctrine it enunciated in Pittsburgh Plate
Glass41 that picketing is permissible if the secondary employer's
premises harbors the situs of the dispute.
A New Policy
Although the per se doctrine of the Board is used to find a viola-
tion where the picketing is extended to secondary sites, it does not
necessarily follow that picketing confined solely to the premises
of the primary employer is protected.
In the Retail Fruit Dealers Ass'n case"2 we begin to see the emer-
gence of a new policy. The Crystal Palace Market, owned by Long,
contained sixty-four fruit and grocery stands, including some gro-
cery stores operated by Long and some leased by him to others, and
fruit stands leased from Long. The union had a contract dispute
with Long and other grocers, but not with the fruit stands whose
employees were represented by a sister local. Long shut down his
stands and ordered his other grocers to do likewise. Long offered to
permit the union to enter Crystal Palace to picket the individual
stand. The union refused. It then picketed the outside entrances
to Crystal Palace, somewhat remote from Long's, with signs show-
ing that its dispute was with Long and other grocers only. Neutral
employees of the fruit stands were induced to remain away from
work. Chairman Leedom and Member Rogers specifically overruled
the Ryan case and their earlier decision in Crump, Inc." They also
inferentially refused to follow the Supreme Court in the Interna-
tional Rice Milling case by stating that the Court's citation of Ryan
was merely "in support of a dictum by the Court" and that in
their opinion the Court did not mean to approve the specific hold-
ing of Ryan. They quoted as "ample precedent" their own decision
in Professional and Business Men's Life Ins. Co.," enforced by the
(1956); Empire State Express, 116 N.L.R.B. 615 (1956); Horn & Hardart Baking Co.,
115 N.L.R.B. 1184 (1956); W. H. Arthur, 115 N.L.R.B. 1137 (1956); Marsh Food
Liners, 114 N.L.R.B. 639 (1955); Cisco Constr. Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 27 (1955); Diaz
Drayage, 39 L.R.R.M. 1322; National Cement Products, 38 L.R.R.M. 1047.4
.Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 110 N.L.R.B. 455, 35 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1954).
42116 N.L.R.B. 856, 38 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1956).
43 Chairman Leedom and Member Bean were either not on the Board or did not parti-
cipate when Crump was decided in April, 1955.
44 108 N.L.R.B. 63, 34 L.R.R.M. 1010 (1954).
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tenth circuit," and the court decision in the damages case of Deena
Artware;" they noted but did not distinguish the companion Board
case of Deena Artware" where the previous Board had followed
the Trial Examiner and found no violation of 8 (b) (4) and the
same circuit had approved the Trial Examiner's findings." Holding
that the union was under a duty to minimize the impact on neutral
employers (citing Southwest Motor Transport, supra), the majority,
however, relied on other facts indicating an unlawful objective,
including (1) the refusal of the offer to enter the Palace to picket
the individual stands, (2) the picketing of entrances remote from
Long's stands and (3) the action of the business agent of the sister
local, representing the fruit stand employees, in inducing neutrals
not to cross the picket line at a time when he was temporarily
assisting the respondent local. Member Bean, the third member
necessary to make up the majority, concurred specially but on the
narrow ground that the grocery stands were closed down and had
no employees or customers. He distinguished Moore Drydock, Ryan
and Pittsburgh Plate Glass," while approving the doctrines of these
cases.
It is interesting to note that although there was no business deal-
ing between the fruit stands (the neutrals) and Long's grocery
stands in their normal trade, these members found that the object
of the union was to force the fruit stands to stop doing business
with Long in his capacity as owner and landlord of the Palace.
In a long dissent Members Murdock and Peterson pointed out
that the decision of the Board reversed its long standing decisions
in Ryan and Pure Oil, approved by the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Rice Milling; that the Board misapplied Moore Drydock,
where the dispute was not taking place, as here, on the primary
employer's premises; and that the Board had set up a new vague
test that the union must "make a bona fide effort to minimize
the impact of its picketing on neutral employers" without specific
standards that would require the union to picket "inside" where the
NLRB v. Local 55, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954).
46 United Brick & Clay Workers v. Deena Artware, Inc., 109 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952).4
"NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
906 (1953); original decision reported 86 N.L.R.B. 732, 24 L.R.R.M. 1675 (1949).
" The two Deena cases are reconciled by the court's holding that both the jury under
Section 303 and the Trial Examiner under Section 8(b) (4) are finders of fact. Thejury found a violation and awarded damage. The Board, following Ryan, found no viola-
tion. Thus these two members are following the jury case and not the Board decision.
41 110 N.L.R.B. 455, 35 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1954). The case involved a common situs
harboring the dispute.
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signs would be concealed from the general public. Also criticizing
the concurring opinion, the dissenting opinion argued:
The concurring opinion presents, if that is possible, an even more
radical departure from established Board and Court law in the area
of secondary boycotts and primary strikes. It reverts to the literal
language of Section 8 (b) (4) ----'the only issue is whether the evidence
shows that the picketing was for a proscribed object." In so doing it
ignores completely the conflict between this Section of the Act and
Sections 13 and 7, a conflict that has absorbed the Board and the
courts ever since passage of the amended Act. As indicated in the cases
cited above, the Board has pointed out over and over again, with the
approval of numerous Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Supreme
Court of the United States, that there is a dual Congressional objective
in this Statute, that of preserving the rights of employees to engage
in the ordinary strike and that of neutral employers to be free from
controversies not their own. The Supreme Court itself, in Inter-
national Rice Milling, pointed out the problem of reconciling the
right to strike with the language of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). Early in
the history of the Act the Board accepted the difficult task of ac-
comodating these rights fairly and reasonably. It is too late in the day
to refuse, as the concurring opinion does, to recognize the existence
of a conflict in these rights when Section 8 (b) (4) is literally applied.
As the Board said in the Pure Oil case, such a decision "might well out-
law virtually every effective strike, for a consequence of all strikes is
some interference with business relationships between the struck em-
ployer and others." To justify the conclusion that this picketing is un-
lawful the concurring opinion relies primarily upon the circumstances
that Long and Standard Groceteria had closed down their grocery op-
erations so that there were no employees in the Market "directly in-
volved in th contract dispute." The record is perfectly clear, however,
that all Long's business activitites, except the grocery department,
continued in full operation during the period of the picketing. More-
over, four other tenants of Long were similarly involved in a contract
dispute with Local 648. Although ordered by Long to remain closed,
it is not clear from the record that these latter stands, in fact, remain-
ed closed after the first day of picketing. But even assuming, contrary
to the fact, that all employees of the primary employers had been lock-
ed out of their jobs, it is indeed a most novel interpretation of Section
8 (b) (4) (A) to find that these employees could not lawfully protest
their lockout to the public by picketing the premises where they had
been, and hoped in the future to be employed. Such a finding is, in
our opinion, a direct infringement of the right of employees to pub-
licize a labor dispute and to engage in concerted activity specifically
guaranteed by Congress in Sections 13 and 7 of the Act. The concur-
ring opinion suggests that an employer may effectively forestall notice
to the public and its other employees that it is engaged in a labor dis-
pute by the simple expedient of closing down its affected operations.
No Board or court decision has ever held or even suggested that a union,
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picketing the premises of a primary employer, must limit its activity
to the single group of the primary employer's employees directly in-
volved in the dispute. The distinction made in the concurring opinion
between Long's "primary stands" (those involved in the dispute) and
his other stands (which it suggests to be secondary) introduces a
wholly new concept. The line drawn by the Board and courts has been
between primary and secondary employers.
As further evidence of this philosophy, in Incorporated Oil Co.,50
the union had abandoned its picketing at the site of an oil station
with which it had a dispute and later again placed the pickets after
a contractor was hired to repair the station, then withdrew its
pickets following the closing of the station and the removal of em-
ployees and again placed them after the contractor returned again
to work on the closed station. The Board found that the conduct
of the union had as its purpose the inducement of the employees
of the contractor to cease work with an object to compel the con-
tractor to stop doing business with the oil company.5 The remark
of the majority in Incorporated Oil shows that we can expect no
clear-cut guide post for the future:
Our decision here is defined and confined by the limitations that are
necessarily infused into it by the facts and records of this case ....
Orderly administration of the statutes entrusted to us is best effectu-
ated by adherence to the practice of deciding cases as they arise and not
adhering to "the past practice of deciding cases as they arise, and not
previously made.
Dissenter Murdock's comment on this is caustically critical:
My colleagues blandly explain their unwillingness to note, discuss,
distinguish, overrule or otherwise delineate the applicability and status
of pertinent precedents like Ryan Construction case, with the state-
ment that "orderly administration" of the Act is best effectuated by
adhering to "the past practice of deciding cases as they arise, and not
by extended discussion of the construction to be placed upon decisions
previously made." But how can the administrative process function
properly if the quasi-judicial body does not decide what its pertinent
precedents mean, and then either apply, distinguish or overrule them?
In that way a systematic and rational body of law is built up case by
case by which parties can govern their conduct. In disagreement with
my colleagues "orderly" way for a quasi-judicial agency to adminis-
ter an Act such as this, but indeed, that such has been the "past prac-
tice" of this Board over the years. The alternative in just "deciding
cases as they arise," without regard to legal principles laid down in
50116 N.L.R.B. 1844 (1956).
" Chairman Leedom, Rogers and Bean all joined in this decision.
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prior decisions, is an ad hoc approach which leaves the parties and the
public in the dark as to what the law is. Between the instant majority
decision and that in the Retail Fruit case, the state of the Board law
with respect to secondary boycotts in important areas is well obfus-
cated. The majority only adds to this confusion when it tells us that
its decision "is defined and confined by the limitations that are neces-
sarily infused into it by the facts and the record of this case."
With this decision it becomes obvious that the Board is repudiating
the principle of the Ryan, Pure Oil line of cases, which was to the
effect that picketing in aid of a primary dispute at the primary
employer's premises, regardless of what incidental secondary effect
it might have, is not thereby converted into secondary picketing.
The test now seems to be that where the picketing has a substantial
secondary effect on employees of secondary employers, either by
its mere location at the secondary employer's site (even if this situs
harbors the dispute) and there is a primary site that may be picket-
ed, or by its timing at the primary situs which brings out a refusal
to cross the picket line by a "group . . . of [neutral] employees
highly sensitive to any further picket line," the Board will infer an
unlawful objective. Thus the test seems to be resolving itself to a
question of the effectiveness of the picket line: if it is successful
in appealing to third party employees it is unlawful.
An Interesting Recent Case
Of more than passing interest is the recent case of W. T. Smith
Lumber Co.," where the Board in the face of a contrary decision
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. International
Rice Milling Co."' decided that railroads are not employers and that
the employees of railroads are not employees within the meaning
of the Act, and that employees of a lumber company on strike do
not violate the law by inducing or encouraging these secondary
legal nonentities from engaging in a secondary boycott. The Board
discussed the recent decision of the Supreme Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, N.H.&H.R.R., decided
January 9, 1956,"" which held that a railroad which the union was
picketing and the customers of which the union was inducing not
to do business with it, was a person within the meaning of the Act,
and could file charges before the NLRB for the secondary boycott
52116 N.L.R.B. 507, 39 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1956).
53See 341 U.S. 665, 28 L.R.R.M. 2105 (1951), affirming, 183 F.2d 21, 26 L.R.R.M.
2295 (sth Cir. 1950).
'4Local 25, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. New York, N.H.&H.R.R., 250
U.S. 155, 37 L.R.R.M. 2271 (1956).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
activities against its customers, who were employers. The Board
in W. T. Smith Lumber Co. followed and relied upon another of
its recent decisions, Paper Makers Importing Co.," which held that
inducement and encouragement of employees of a secondary muni-
cipal corporation operating docks and employing dock workers is
not a violation of the Act since a municipal corporation is not an
employer within the meaning of the Act, and its employees are not
employees within the Act.
Although W. T. Smith Lumber Co. and Paper Makers Importing
Co. hold that inducement of employees of a municipal corporation
or a railroad is not and cannot be unlawful under the Act, a sec-
ondary boycott does exist where the union has a primary dispute
with another employer and the railroad or municipality is the sec-
ondary employer, if employees of the contractors working for the
political subdivision are unlawfully induced to strike to force the
political subdivision to stop doing business with a contractor."
Also, while the New York, New Haven case holds that an Ameri-
can employer excluded from the Act may nevertheless file charges,
a recent Supreme Court case, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,"
holds that a foreign corporation employing foreign seamen may not
file charges or utilize the processes of the Board.
THE "HOT CARGO" CLAUSES
No problem in the interpretation of Section 8 (b) (4) presents
more difficulty than the so-called "hot cargo" cases.
These cases arise where the union or an ally union which is en-
gaged in dispute with a primary employer has entered into a pre-
vious contract with a secondary employer, the contract containing
various provisions reserving to the union or the employee the right
not to handle goods or perform services for another employer with
whom the union has a dispute, or providing that it shall not be
cause for discharge for an employee to refuse to handle such goods,
or reserving to employees the right not to work on non-union made
articles, or, even, provisions that the employer will not subcontract
work to non-union employers. These clauses are extremely varied
and complex. The doctrine covering hot cargoes originated in the
Conway Express caseW' where two of the secondary employers had
contracts providing in substance that the union reserved the right
55 116 N.L.R.B. 267, 38 L.R.R.M. 1228 (1956).
'6117 N.L.R.B. No. 60, 39 L.R.R.M. 1250 (1957).
57353 U.S. 138 (April 6, 1957).
" 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 25 L.R.R.M. 1202 (1949).
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to refuse to handle unfair goods. The union notified its shop stew-
ards, employees of the secondary employers, of the provisions of
this contract, and in reliance thereon the employees of these em-
ployers refused to handle the hot goods from the struck employer.
The secondary employers apparently acquiesced in their employees'
refusal to handle the goods. The Board held:
The Act prohibits labor organizations from "forcing or requiring"
participation of neutral employers in secondary boycotts by the use of
certain forms of employees pressure, namely, strikes or work stoppages,
either actually engaged in or induced or encouraged by the union. This
section does not proscribe other means by which unions may induce
employers to aid them in effectuating secondary boycotts. Much less
does it prohibit employers from refusing to deal with other persons
whether because they desire to assist a labor organization in the pro-
tection of its working standards or for other reasons. An employer re-
mains free under that section of the amended Act, as always, to deal
with other firms, union or non-union, as he chooses. By the same token
there is nothing in the expressed provisions or underlying policies of
Section 8 (b) (4) which prohibits an employer and a union from
voluntarily including hot cargo or struck work provisions in their col-
lective bargaining contracts or from honoring these provisions.
The Board was thus finding that the secondary employers had
consented in advance by contract to a boycott of the primary em-
ployer's goods. This reasoning was based on the proposition that
it is no violation of Section 8 (b) (4) for an employer at the request
of a union voluntarily to agree to boycott the goods of another
employer." Later in Pittsburgh Plate Glass (No. 1)," where the
contract provided that it would not be cause for discharge if "the
employees" refused to handle unfair goods, the Board followed this
theory and added another, that the refusal of the secondary em-
ployer's employees to handle freight did not constitute a refusal
to perform work "in the course of their employment," as required
by Section 8 (b) (4), since the employer had consented to this by
contract. In both of these cases the appeals actually were directed
to the employees but the employers at the time acquiesced in the
action of their employees. The Conway Express case was enforced
by the second circuit which adopted the Board's theory."' These
"Arkansas Express, 92 N.L.R.B. 255, 27 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1950); Lewis Karlton,
d/b/a Consolidation Frame Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1295, 27 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1950); Sealright
Pacific, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 271, 23 L.R.R.M. 1572 (1949).
60105 N.L.R.B. 740, 32 L.R.R.M. 1350 (1953). (Not the same case as in notes 32,
41 and 49, supra.)
6 Rabouin, d/b/a Conway's Express v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 29 L.R.R.M. 2617
(2d Cir. 1952).
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two decisions were followed by two United States District Courts."'
This apparently was the settled law from 1949 until December
1954, when the Board had before it the McAllister Transfer case."
Chairman Farmer and Members Murdock, Peterson, Rogers and
Beeson participated. It was a classic secondary boycott situation
where, pursuant to a dispute for recognition with McAllister, the
Teamsters Union persuaded the employees of three secondary freight
lines to refuse to handle the freight. The article in the agreements
originally provided that it would not be cause for discharge for
the employees to refuse to handle such freight, but this was sub-
sequently amended after the Conway Express decision to provide
that the union and its members individually and collectively re-
served the right to refuse to handle such freight. Here, however,
the McAllister case is lightly distinguishable for, despite the con-
tract, the secondary employers posted a notice to the effect that they
had no dispute with any labor organization and that their obliga-
tions as common carriers required them to handle all freight tend-
ered to them, and directing their employees to handle the freight.
The employees continued to refuse and were not disciplined by the
lines. The three member majority of the Board split on their reasons
for finding a violation despite the so-called hot cargo provisions
of the contract. Members Beeson and Rogers' opinion held that
such clauses were contrary to the public policy of the Act and that
employers could not in advance waive by contract a violation of
the public policy implicit in the provisions of Section 8 (b) (4).
This opinion did not consider or discuss the settled doctrine that
an employer may voluntarily agree to boycott the goods of another
employer. These two members specifically overruled both the Con-
way and Pittsburgh Plate Glass (No. 1) doctrines. Chairman Farm-
er, the third member of the majority, took an entirely different
view, reaffirming his faith in the theory that such contracts were
legal under the accepted interpretation which permits an employer
voluntarily to agree to boycott another employer at the time of the
appearance of the dispute and reaffirming both the Conway and
Pittsburgh Plate Glass doctrines; he held that such clauses were
not against public policy, but found on the facts that the union
had affirmatively induced and encouraged its members to refuse
"ZMadden v. Local 442, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL, 114 F. Supp. 932,
32 L.R.R.M. 2722 (W.D. Wis. 1953); NLRB v. Lodge, 850, AFL Machinists, - F.
Supp. - (E.D. Okla. October 16, 1954).
' 110 N.L.R.B. 1769, 35 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1954).
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to handle McAllister's freight despite the secondary employers'
instructions to them. Chairman Farmer said:
Thus we are confronted here with a case in which all of the elements
of a violation, inducement, refusal and unlawful objective have been
proven. The fact that one or more of these essential elements might have
been lacking had the secondary employer adhered to his contract under-
taken to boycott hot cargo is not enough to bring this case within the
holding of the Conway decision.
To these opinions combined to make the majority decision there
were vigorous dissents by Members Murdock and Peterson, citing
the legislative history showing that there was nothing that prevent-
ed such a waiver if it might be so construed, and again emphasizing
that Section 8 (b) (4) allows the secondary employer to re-
frain from dealing with any person he chooses; they also pointed
out that the Board was in effect approving a breach by one party
of a valid agreement which subjects the other party to a finding
that it has violated the Act.
It should be observed that the Board has never said that a union
may strike to obtain such a contract, and in their dissent Members
Murdock and Peterson argue that such an agreement is not unlaw-
ful and against public policy "so long as the employer's consent is
won by means short of an actual strike or refusal to work or the
unlawful inducement of his employees to strike or refuse to work
which are the sole influences from which the employer is protected
by Section 8 (b) (4)."
On the same day as the McAllister decision, the Board rendered
its decision in the Reilly Cartage Co. case." The latter involved a
question of subcontracting where the union contract contained a
provision in which the employer agreed that in subcontracting any
work or any part of it, either to individual owners or other sub-
contractors, that any subcontractor would comply with the articles
of the agreement, and further requiring all employees to become
and remain members of the union. When the cartage companies sub-
contracted to a non-union contractor the union notified its members
employed by the cartage companies. The members refused to handle
the freight for the subcontractor. Although the Trial Examiner
had found that the activities of the union were protected by the
Conway and Pittsburgh Plate Glass (No. 1) doctrine, the same
majority of the Board, Chairman Farmer and Members Rogers and
Beeson, found a secondary boycott to exist. Chairman Farmer so
64l10 N.L.R.B. 1742, 35 L.R.R.M. 1292 (1954).
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found because the contract provision was markedly different and
neither contained a reservation of any rights to the union nor pro-
tected the employee members against discharge for refusal to per-
form the work, and for the further reason that the carrier's conduct
did not demonstrate consent to the action on the part of the union.
Members Rogers and Beeson agreed for their reasons in McAllister.
Again Members Murdock and Peterson vigorously dissented, both
on their McAllister (dissent) theory and on the factual findings.
The situation remained in this somewhat confused state with
two members (Beeson and Rogers) definitely committed to the
theory that hot cargo clauses were contrary to public policy, two
members (Murdock and Peterson) feeling just as strongly that they
were permissible and valid matters of voluntary contract and with
Chairman Farmer casting his vote on a factual basis as to whether
or not the employer (despite the contract) had actually acquiesced
at the time of the occurrence of the secondary boycott, until the
Board's decision in Sand Door & Plywood Co.6 By this time Board
Member Beeson had been replaced by Member Leedom, who is pre-
sently the Chairman of the Board. Again the facts are important.
The contractors Havestard and Jenson were using non-union doors
made by the Paine Company in Wisconsin. The union business agent
approached the contractors' foreman, who was also a member of
the Carpenters Union and, as the Board says, "told" the foreman
to quit hanging the doors. The agent also told the superintendent
that he had orders from the district council to stop the men from
hanging the doors and that he would have pulled them (the men)
off the day before. The contract provided that "working men shall
not be required to handle non-union materials."
Chairman Farmer with the concurrence of Member Leedom held
that unions which are parties to such a contract may not approach
the employees of the contracting employer and induce and encourage
them to refuse to handle the goods, and that such conduct consti-
tutes inducement or encouragement of employees to engage in con-
certed refusal to handle goods for an object proscribed by Section
8 (b) (4), no less than it does in the absence of such agreements.
Specifically this opinion held:
The employer, but not the union may instruct his employees to cease
handling goods sought to be boycotted. Until the employer instructs
his employees they need not handle the unfair products, a strike or
concerted refusal to handle such goods constitutes a strike or concerted
'5 113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 36 L.R.R.M. 1478 (1955).
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refusal in the course of employment to handle the goods within the
meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). (Emphasis added.)
This opinion specifically overrules Pittsburgh Plate Glass (No. 1)
on this point but reaffirms the basic holdings of Conway Express
and Pittsburgh Plate Glass (No. 1). Member Rogers, who this time
was the third man making up the majority (whereas Chairman
Farmer had been the necessary third man in McAllister and Reilly
Cartage) again concurred in the majority result upon his theory
that hot cargo clauses are against public policy. Of particular in-
terest in this case was the handling of the fact that the approach
had been made by the business agent to the foreman. The Board
found that the foreman was a member of the Carpenters Union
and further that he was at a low level of management and not
normally an official who would be approached for the purpose of
enforcing a contract or on matters of company policy; and that
this foreman ordered the employees under him to stop handling the
doors, thereby inducing and encouraging them to engage in a con-
certed refusal.' The Board found that the foreman was the agent
of the union since he had acted on orders of the business agent, and in
this connection it emphasized the fact that the foreman as a member
of the union was bound by the by-laws and rules of the union
(which provided that no member should handle, install or erect
any non-union material) and that he was responsible for the en-
forcement of this trade rule, under penalty of fine and expulsion.
This use of constitutions and by-laws of the local organizations,
though not specifically referred to in the contract, is a device fre-
quently employed by the Board to sustain findings of inducement
and encouragement. The finding that the foreman becomes the agent
of the union and not of the employer because of the provisions of
the by-laws is a two-edged sword that leaves the unions practically
defenseless, particularly in the building and construction trades
where a man frequently moves from journeyman to foreman and
even up to superintendent, depending upon the size of the job, yet
desires to retain his membership in the organization for the pur-
pose of obtaining work in slack times and on other jobs. This can
be combatted only by either completely eliminating provisions in
constitutions and by-laws which were originally designed to protect
the job opportunities of the members or by specific contract pro-
visions that the member upon promotion will become the agent of
the employer and inactive in his membership in the organization.
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Even such provisions may not satisfactorily pass the present Board's
scrutiny.
Members Peterson and Murdock again dissented vigorously, par-
ticularly opposing the finding that the foreman was acting solely
as the agent of the union rather than at least as a joint agent of the
union and the employer, and the conclusion that employees obeying
instructions of their foreman were being induced to engage in a
strike or concerted activity by the union.
The case has another unique feature since it demonstrates the
dual standards of jurisdiction. Although Members Rogers and Bee-
son in the McAllister case made this statement:
It is no slight matter for the Board to write in a double standard in the
Act, one for the employers and another for unions as the so-called
Conway doctrine has done ....
Member Rogers does not hesitate to apply a double standard for
asserting jurisdiction. In this case (Sand Door & Plywood) it was
clear that the Board would not assert jurisdiction over the con-
tractors involved in the dispute and consequently would not have
entertained charges or petitions filed by the union. Nevertheless,
in order to accumulate sufficient commerce to entertain the sec-
ondary boycott complaint against the union the Board took into
consideration the outflow from the State of Wisconsin of the Paine
Lumber Company, the manufacturer of the doors, although Paine
was not actively involved in the dispute and though the inflow of
materials into California, where the dispute was active, was not suf-
ficient to enable the Board to assert jurisdiction. Again the two dis-
senters Murdock and Peterson vigorously contested this double
standard."
This series of cases seems to demonstrate clearly that the inter-
pretation of permissible conduct under the statute depends in large
measure on the philosophy of the membership of the Board at the
time the case comes before it.
The case to complete this cycle is American Iron & Machine
Works Co., 7 decided in March 1956. The Teamsters Union, in aid
of a strike by the Machinists at the American Iron Company, in
reliance on a typical hot cargo provision in their contracts induced
the employees of various carriers not to handle the freight of the
American Iron Company. One carrier acquiesced in this refusal but
four did not. By the time this case reached the Board, Member
"Also see, General Mill Work Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 1084, 36 L.R.R.M. 1484 (1955).
67115 N.L.R.B. 800, 37 L.R.R.M. 1395 (1956).
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Bean had replaced Chairman Farmer and Member Leedom had be-
come Chairman. The case demonstrates a further extension of the
doctrine first announced by Chairman Farmer in his opinion in
McAllister, viz., that direct inducement of employees is unlawful
despite the contract provisions where the employer has not acqui-
esced at the time of the secondary boycott. The opinion of Chair-
man Leedom and Bean holds that any direct appeal by a union to
employees, urging them to engage in a strike or concerted refusal
to handle a product, is proscribed by the Act when one of the ob-
jects set forth in Section 8 (b) (4) (A) is present. Thus, while Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A) does not forbid the execution of a hot cargo
clause or a union's enforcement thereof by an appeal to the em-
ployer to honor his contract, the Act does in the opinion of the
Board
preclude enforcement of such clauses by appeals to employees and
this is so whether or not the employer acquiesces in the union's de-
mand that the employees refuse to handle the hot goods.
They go on to hold:
We do not find it necessary to reply as (the Trial Examiner) did on
the fact that the secondary employers herein did not acquiesce in the
refusal of their employees to handle American Iron's freight. In our
view it is sufficient that there was direct inducement of such employees
by Teamsters not to handle such freight with an object of forcing the
secondary employers to cease dealing with American Iron.
Member Rogers again concurs on his public policy theory, and
Murdock and Peterson (dissenting) point out that the Board had
then completely reversed the Conway and Pittsburgh Plate Glass
(No. 1) cases. The dissenters are sharply critical of the split ma-
jority which holds that such a contract is valid under the Act but
on the other hand that such an agreement is not a defense to an
appeal by the union to employees not to handle goods. They say:
We can only read this decision as meaning that an agreement is not
an agreement whenever the actual facts contemplated by the agree-
ment arise.
and again:
What good is a contract that deprives one of the parties of a benefit
derived through collective bargaining unless the other party unilaterally
decides to honor his contract rather than to breach it. Indeed the lang-
uage of this decision is so broad that even if an employer reaffirms its
adherence to an existing contract the union may not under penalty of




They point out that under the American Iron decision, if carried
to its logical conclusion, officials of the union could not discuss the
hot cargo clause at membership meetings or send copies of the con-
tract to union members on whose behalf it was signed.
Hot Cargo Clauses Before the Courts
It took more than five years after the Conway case for another
court to consider this doctrine. The Board's decision in Sand Door
& Plywood Co. was recently enforced by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals (on February 12, 1957)." The court's decision does not
thoroughly discuss the basic problem and does not consider the
argument that since an employer may voluntarily agree to boycott
another employer he may do so by contract, nor does it discuss
the second circuit's Conway case."9 The court quotes with approval
from the later Board case of American Iron & Machine Works
and from the Rogers and Beeson opinion in McAllister that hot
cargo clauses were against public policy as if this was the majority
view in that case, without noting that actually the required ma-
jority in McAllister was made up only by virtue of Farmer's de-
cision on the factual issue. There also appears this curious statement
in the court's opinion in Sand Door & Plywood Co.:
An employer may well remain free to decide as a matter of business
policy whether he will accede to a union's boycott demands or if he
has already agreed to do so whether he will fulfill his agreement. An
entirely different situation, however, is presented under 8 (b) (4) (A)
of the Act when it is sought to influence the employer's decision by a
work stoppage of his employees.
Thus the court seems to endorse the principle that an employer
need not live up to his agreements. However, when treating the
question as to whether the foreman was the agent of the union
or the employer, the court decided that the foreman was irrevocably
bound by his obligation as a member (although this also is a matter
of contract) and that no contract between the union and his em-
ployer would interfere with this relationship. Since the doctrine
of these cases involves a legal theory of the application of the Act,
as well as factual consideration, the decision leaves much to be de-
sired in its failure to discuss the Conway case or the vigorous dis-
sents in Conway, American Iron & Machine Works and McAllister.
On April 10, 1957, the Sixth Circuit enforced the General Mill
68 31 CCH Lab. Cas. par. 70,504.
6 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 25 L.R.R.M. 1202 (1949). Note 59, supra.
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Works case,70 rendered by the Board the same day as Sand Door &
Plywood. The General Mill Works case contains an excellent dis-
cussion of the hot cargo theories, the conway case and all the lead-
ing cases decided by the Board, and points out the difficulty of the
problem, but then decides to adopt the Board's finding that there
was no hot cargo clause in the case. The court held that the Board's
finding that the subcontractors themselves were members of the
union and obliged to observe union working rules did not excuse
a direct appeal to the employees not to work on non-union doors.
Thus we are still without a clear-cut court decision on this im-
portant point. The door is now open for the Supreme Court to
take the matter if it so desires.
It seems clear that under present Board decisions, even with clear
hot cargo clauses, appeals may not be made to the employees but
may still be made to the employer. However, if the employer does
not acquiesce; this appeal may later be used as evidence of an un-
lawful objective if the employees subsequently refuse to handle the
hot goods. As a further note of interest, in connection with hot
cargo clauses involving licensed ICC carriers, an ICC Examiner has
recently found, without passing on the legality of the hot cargo
clauses, that a common carrier may not bargain away its obligations
and duties to the public by observing such a clause in the absence
of an actual picket line or a situation where the operation of the
truck is impractical because violent action may cause injury. The
opinion, of course, is subject to review by the ICC. 1
SECTIONS 8 (b) (4) (C) AND 8 (b) (4) (D)
In connection with Sections 8 (b) (4) (C) and 8 (b) (4) (D),
some recent decisions are interesting. In jurisdictional dispute cases
coming under Section 8 (b) (4) (D), the Board's policy has been,
after issuance of the notice of hearing and the taking of evidence,
routinely to find that the employer has the right to assign the work
in the first instance and that his assignment of work to a particular
craft or trade jurisdiction cannot be controverted. Hence any work
stoppage by another disputing this is a violation of subsection (D),
which, upon failure of the union to comply with the Board's order
awarding the work as assigned by the employer, may result in an
injunction against the labor organization."2
7NLRB v. Local 11, Carpenters, 39 L.R.R.M. 2731 (April 10, 1957).
71 Cf. 39 L.R.R.M. 483.




In a decision rendered on March 27, 1957,"8 NLRB v. Pipefitters
Local, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals severely criticized the
Board for abrogating its duty under Section 8 (b) (4) (D), as re-
vealed by the legislative history of the Section and by the Board's
own rules and regulations, by making so limited a determination and
for not actually deciding and determining the dispute itself on its
merits as required by the statute. The court accused the Board of
disregarding the provisions of Sections 8 (b) (4) (D) and 10(k)
and denied the enforcement of the Board's order.
Section 8 (b) (4) (C)
Section 8 (b) (4) (C) prohibits primary picketing of an employer
for recognition where another union has been certified. The decisions
of the Board on this point follow the subsection literally. However
the Board's decisions have not handled the problem where the cer-
tified union is defunct. In a recent decision the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals directly decides this. The court had before it a damage
suit brought under Section 303. A union picketed the plant of an
employer who at the time had a certified union which was then de-
funct and no longer functioning as bargaining agent. The court,
relying on numerous Board and court cases holding that the certi-
fication is valid until revoked, held that the picketing violated
Section 303 and the companion section, Section 8 (b) (4) (C), since
nothing had been done prior to the picketing to disturb the certi-
fication of the certified union."'
CONCLUSION
The recent cases clearly indicate that the once well established
doctrines of Ryan, Pure Oil, Moore Drydock and Conway Express,
although repeatedly court tested and approved (even in some in-
stances by the Supreme Court of the United States) can no longer
be relied on in advising clients of their rights and obligations under
the Act.
The present Board seems definitely to tend toward a literal inter-
pretation of Section 8 (b) (4) and to give little if any weight to
a balancing of the affirmative protections contained in Section 7
and 13.*
*NOTE: After this paper was prepared the Court of Appeals for the Disrict of
Columbia on May 9, 1957, rendered its opinion in General Drivers Union v. NLRB
7a F.2d -, 39 L.R.R.M. 2629 (3d Cir. 1957).
74Parks v. Atlanta Printing Pressmen, - F.2d -, 39 L.R.R.M. 2669 (5th Cir.
April S, 1957).
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(American Iron d Machine Works Co. case), supra. A divided court followed the Conway
case in holding that the Teamsters Union which held the contract with the secondary
employers had a right to make direct appeal to the employees not to handle the hot
goods. It discusses and disagrees with the Sand Door d Plywood Co. case, Judges Bastian
and Washington forming the majority on this point and Judge Prettyman dissenting.
However, Judges Bastian and Prettyman, forming the majority, decided that the Ma-
chinists Union which was involved in the dispute with the primary employer and which
did not hold such a contract with the secondary employers could not take advantage of
the Teamsters' contract and had no right to appeal to the secondary employees not to
handle the hot cargo; to this portion of the opinion, Judge Washington dissented.
The way is now clearly set for the Supreme Court to settle the conflicts between the
Second Circuit (Conway) and its ally the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
(American Iron & Machine Works), on the one hand, and the decision of the Ninth
Circuit (Sand Door and Plywood), on the other.
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